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Introduction
his paper is intended as background material for a cross-
disciplinary conference, sponsored by the Board on 
Mathematical Sciences and Their Applications of the National 
Academy of Sciences and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
on new approaches to evaluating systemic risks and managing 
systemic events in the global financial system. A key objective 
of the conference is to bring together a diverse group of leading 
researchers who have developed analytical tools for the study 
of complex systems in a range of fields of inquiry.
The stability of the financial system and the potential for 
systemic risks to alter the functioning of that system have long 
been important topics for central banks and for the related 
research community. However, recent experiences, including 
the market disruption following the attacks of September 11, 
2001, suggest that existing models of systemic shocks in the 
financial system may not adequately capture the propagation 
of major disturbances. For example, current models do not 
fully reflect the increasing complexity of the financial system’s 
structure, the complete range of financial and information 
flows, and the diverse nature of the endogenous behavior of 
different agents in the system. Fresh thinking about systemic 
risk is therefore desirable.
This paper describes the broad features of the global 
financial system and the models with which researchers and 
central bankers have typically approached the issues of 
financial stability and systemic risk—information that can 
serve as a shared reference for conference participants. The 
conference itself will provide an opportunity for participants 
to discuss related research in other fields and to draw out 
potential connections to financial system mechanisms and 
models, with the ultimate goal of stimulating new ways of 
thinking about systemic risk in the financial system.
Systemic risk is a difficult concept to define precisely. 
A recent report by the Group of Ten (2001) on financial sector 
consolidation defined systemic risk as “the risk that an event 
will trigger a loss of economic value or confidence in, and 
attendant increases in uncertainty about, a substantial portion 
of the financial system that is serious enough to quite probably 
have significant adverse effects on the real economy.” This 
definition is broad enough to permit different views on 
whether certain recent episodes within the financial system 
constituted true systemic risk or only threatened to become 
systemic if they had a significant adverse impact on the real 
economy.
Some argue that even damage to the real economy is not 
sufficient grounds to classify an episode as systemic; rather, 
the key characteristic of systemic risk is the movement from 
one stable (positive) equilibrium to another stable (negative) 
equilibrium for the economy and financial system. According 
to this view, research on systemic risk should focus on the 
potential causes and propagation mechanisms for the “phase 
transition” to a new but much less desirable equilibrium as well 
as the “reinforcing feedbacks” that tend to keep the economy 
and financial system trapped in that equilibrium.
While differences in the definition of systemic risk are 
clearly important from a policymaking perspective, this paper 
includes discussions of episodes that not everyone would agree 
were systemic in nature. This is because our primary interest is 
in stimulating further research on the types of propagation or 
feedback mechanisms that might cause a small financial shock 
to become a major disturbance, allow a financial shock to have 
a material impact on the real economy, or mire the financial 
system in a suboptimal equilibrium. In this regard, the 
dynamics of nonsystemic episodes may still be very relevant to 
the modeling of financial market behavior. Moreover, as noted 
by a recent private sector report on risk management practices 
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(Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group II 2005), 
“Unfortunately, in real time it is virtually impossible to draw 
such distinctions.”
The remainder of this paper is divided into three sections. 
The first describes the classical case of systemic risk in a 
banking-dominated financial system and provides some 
background information on the current workings of the 
international banking system. The second section focuses on 
issues that arise in market-oriented “panics” (for example, the 
October 1987 stock market crash) and again seeks to provide 
some relevant background information. The third section 
discusses the challenges in understanding the full nature of 
systemic risk posed by events of the last decade (for example, 
the Asian currency crises and 9/11 payments system 
disruptions) as well as key ongoing trends in the financial 
markets generally. Significantly, this paper is meant primarily 
to stimulate discussion of relevant issues at the conference; 
it is not intended to provide a comprehensive overview of the 
substantial economic literature on systemic risk and financial 
instability.
Systemic Risk in Banking Systems
Banks have long been at the center of financial activity. 
They remain so today, even though their share of financial 
intermediation has been reduced by the growth of capital 
markets and mutual funds and other developments of the last 
few decades. The largest commercial banks have balance sheets 
in the $1 trillion range, engage in extensive international 
operations, and maintain a presence in a wide variety of retail 
and wholesale financial business activities. These activities 
include making loans to corporations and individuals; 
underwriting debt and equity securities offerings; acting as 
dealers in foreign exchange, securities, and derivatives markets; 
providing asset management services; providing payments, 
settlement, and custodial services; and taking deposits.
The classical model of a commercial bank is a firm that 
makes loans on the asset side of its balance sheet and takes 
demand deposits (checking and savings accounts) on the 
liability side.1 The loans are typically perceived as being long-
term “illiquid” assets in the sense that efforts to liquidate them 
prior to maturity will yield a reduced value relative to their 
1The following discussion draws heavily on Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
intrinsic worth if held to maturity. However, the bank is 
obligated to pay back demand deposits at any time the 
depositor requests. Thus, banks are seen as providing a 
fundamental maturity and liquidity transformation that is 
both beneficial and inherently unstable.
This instability can be seen by considering a case in which 
each depositor at a particular bank would be willing to leave his 
or her funds on deposit, but believes that other depositors are 
likely to withdraw their funds, thus making it necessary for the 
bank to call in its loans and suffer the associated losses. In this 
case, all rational depositors will seek to withdraw their funds 
as quickly as possible, producing a “run” on the bank. In this 
simplified model, bank runs can be caused by concerns over 
liquidity even if the bank’s assets are fundamentally sound 
on a going-concern basis (that is, the bank is solvent). The 
distinction between illiquidity and insolvency is one that 
occurs repeatedly in discussions of systemic risk.
Moreover, in this model, bank runs can be contagious. 
The contagion can arise simply as a result of a self-fulfilling 
prophecy if depositors believe that other depositors will regard 
a run at one bank as an indication that runs are now more likely 
at other banks. Somewhat more concretely, contagion may be 
more likely to occur if the issue that sparked the original run—
excessive loan exposure to real estate or the oil industry, for 
example—is perceived potentially to affect other banks, or is 
the result of concerns about significant interbank exposures 
(that is, runs at banks seen as having large exposures to the 
bank subject to the original run). Naturally, in this model, runs 
are more likely at banks perceived to have a smaller equity 
capital cushion to absorb declines in asset values and at banks 
whose financial condition is difficult to assess in the first place.  
Although the model just described is highly simplified, it 
nevertheless captures the essence of past bank runs, which 
occurred with some frequency before the 1930s. The primary 
approaches to dealing with the risks inherent in banking 
activity have included 1) controlling the relative risk of the 
loans extended—for example, through regulation, 2) requiring 
that bank balance sheets contain a larger share of equity capital 
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and a smaller share of demand deposits, and 3) ensuring that 
government provides a “lender of last resort” function and/or 
deposit insurance.
The lender of last resort role is one of the most distinctive 
functions of central banks. In this role, central banks such as 
the Federal Reserve typically have the authority to provide 
short-term loans to banks against collateral. For example, 
a bank could pledge some of its loans to the central bank and 
obtain cash on a short-term basis. In determining whether to 
provide funds, the central bank must make a judgment about 
the bank seeking funds. The conventional wisdom that 
emerged in the nineteenth century was that central banks 
should “lend freely at a penalty rate” when they believe that the 
bank needing funds is illiquid but not insolvent, but should not 
lend at all to a bank that is truly insolvent. Of course, there is 
often substantial practical difficulty in distinguishing illiquidity 
from insolvency.
The provision of deposit insurance in the United States 
followed the bank runs of the early 1930s. Deposit insurance 
aims to eliminate the threat of a bank run directly, by assuring 
depositors that they will be paid regardless of whether the bank 
ultimately fails. While clearly effective in discouraging bank 
runs, deposit insurance further reinforced the need for bank 
regulation to limit the extent of banks’ risk taking. Economists 
refer to the incentive problems created by the presence of 
deposit insurance as an instance of “moral hazard.” That is, 
bank managers will want to take on risk to increase their upside 
potential, but insured depositors will have no incentive to 
monitor or constrain their behavior. Thus, the bank runs of the 
Great Depression served to shape the institutional framework 
in which banks operate today—a framework that emphasizes 
official regulation and supervision of banks.
In considering the systemic risk associated with banking 
crises, one should also bear in mind the social costs of such 
episodes. On balance, the economic literature on the Great 
Depression in the United States concludes that much of the 
social cost of this episode stemmed from the interruption to 
credit allocation that occurred as a result of the bank runs 
and contraction of the money supply. That is, the broader, 
nonfinancial portion of the economy was seriously hurt by 
the interruption in the financing of its activities and by the 
reluctance of banks to extend new financing amid a series of 
bank runs. Concern that financial sector crises may adversely 
affect the functioning of many other parts of the economy 
is a recurrent theme in discussions of systemic risk.
Although the overall importance of banks within the 
financial system has declined in the last few decades, the largest 
banks in the key financial centers remain sufficiently important 
that their failure to function normally would raise questions 
of a systemic nature. Significantly, these institutions exhibit 
several of the characteristics discussed above.
￿ They are highly leveraged, with equity-to-total-asset 
ratios ranging between 5 percent and 10 percent.
￿ While banks are less reliant on short-term-deposit 
funding than the stylized model just outlined would 
imply, such funding remains a material part of the 
liability structure for the largest institutions.
￿ The scope and complexity of their activities and legal/
organizational structures make assessments of their true 
financial condition by outsiders difficult, while also 
posing significant management challenges for the banks 
themselves.
￿ The largest banks typically have significant exposures to 
one another, for example, through interbank deposit 
markets, interdealer transactions in over-the-counter 
derivatives, and wholesale payment and settlement 
arrangements.
￿ According to some commentators, banks remain 
particularly prone to cyclicality and myopia in their 
credit processes, tending to forget the last cycle of bad 
lending too rapidly when economic conditions brighten. 
The old saying that “bad loans are made in good times” 
captures the essence of this concern.
￿ Finally, the largest banks appear to be increasingly 
subject to legal and regulatory risks stemming from 
actions of their employees, risks that in some cases could 
result in sudden adverse impacts.
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Nevertheless, despite the vulnerabilities just outlined, 
the financial system today does not seem highly prone to 
contagious runs on very large banks. This reflects the relative 
profitability and health of banks in many countries, their risk 
management discipline, and the perception that the largest 
banks would benefit from liquidity provision or other forms 
of official assistance should runs appear imminent. In Japan, 
for example, official intervention following the emergence of 
significant banking sector problems in the 1990s largely 
forestalled major bank runs. Interestingly, however, Japan’s 
policies to prevent runs did not prevent economic weakness 
associated with a banking sector too fragile to play a full and 
vibrant role in financing broader economic activity. In the 
United States, policymakers have indicated that large banks are 
not “too big to fail” and have worked to ensure that such banks 
maintain a strong financial condition and adopt rigorous risk 
management policies and procedures.
This last point reflects a concern that inappropriate public 
policy choices can serve to generate systemic risk. For example, 
many observers note that the U.S. savings and loan crisis of the 
late 1980s resulted in part from policies that paid insufficient 
attention to “moral hazard” concerns. In addition, supervisors 
failed to deal with insolvent firms promptly, creating strong 
incentives for the management of such firms to invest in high-
risk projects in an effort to restore solvency. The downside risks 
of these (frequently suboptimal) investments ended up being 
borne by society at large, both in the cost of government 
bailouts of depositors and in the opportunity loss of numerous 
investments yielding little or no return. 
While the liquidity-based contagious run model of systemic 
risk applies very directly to banks, it also has relevance to other 
kinds of institutions. The largest securities firms rely on debt 
rather than bank deposits as a significant funding source and 
hold a greater share of their assets in the form of marketable 
securities than do banks. Nevertheless, some analysts have 
argued that securities firms may be vulnerable to contagious 
runs because of their reliance on short-term funding sources 
such as commercial paper, the complexity of their transactions 
in less liquid securities markets, and their derivatives 
businesses. As leveraged institutions, hedge funds that do not 
effectively manage their liquidity risks could also be subject to 
runs by their investors and creditors. Indeed, liquidity risk 
management failures contributed to the problems experienced 
by the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) hedge fund 
in 1998. The case of LTCM is discussed further in this paper’s 
final section, as it raises other issues about the sources and 
propagation of systemic risk.
Significantly, a run on an individual firm alone might not 
be enough to create systemic risk according to the definition 
outlined above unless the liquidation of assets by the firm or an 
associated reduction in the firm’s underwriting activities were 
to have a material impact on economic growth. For example, in 
2001, Enron suffered what amounted to a run on its short-term 
liabilities in the period immediately preceding its bankruptcy 
filing, but there appeared to be very limited systemic contagion 
to other energy-trading firms and very little impact on the 
broader economy. 
Systemic Risk in Financial 
Asset Markets
While the bank run model of systemic risk has been studied 
fairly widely in the financial economics literature, more recent 
examples of events in which concerns about systemic risk arose 
have often been associated with disruptions to financial 
markets, rather than runs on particular financial institutions. 
For example, the 1987 stock market crash was not precipitated 
by concerns at an individual institution, nor was it the proxi-
mate cause of the failure of any large bank. Nevertheless, it was 
clearly viewed—at the time and since—as an event with 
potentially systemic consequences that warranted official 
sector intervention. 
A market-oriented systemic crisis typically manifests itself as 
a breakdown in the functioning of financial markets for traded 
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assets such as stocks and bonds, and it may develop in response 
to a sharp decline in the value of one particular type of asset. 
In addition to the 1987 stock market crash, examples of such 
crises might include the widening of interest rate spreads and 
decline in liquidity following the collapse of LTCM in 1998 and 
the collapse of the junk bond market in 1989-90. In the more 
distant past, the Dutch tulip mania of the 1630s and similar 
episodes could, in their end-stage, be viewed as additional 
examples of this type of crisis.
Consider first the characteristics of the 1987 stock market 
crash. Two aspects of this systemic market episode are 
particularly important to highlight. First, the episode suggests 
that asset price declines can in some circumstances become 
self-reinforcing and even feed into a reduced willingness on the 
part of major financial institutions to bear risk across the full 
range of their activities. Second, the episode underscores the 
potential importance of not only the specific institutional 
arrangements that are in place for clearance and settlement of 
transactions but also the credit and liquidity exposures arising 
from those arrangements. 
Market-Based Financial Crises, Liquidity, 
and Self-Reinforcing Price Movements
The shift of emphasis from bank runs to “market gridlock” as 
a source of systemic risk has arisen from a number of factors, 
not least the success of policies aimed at preventing bank runs 
mentioned earlier. In addition, financial crises now manifest 
themselves in markets rather than in institutions because 
financial intermediation has moved into markets and away 
from institutions. This “disintermediation” in financial activity 
has been particularly pronounced in the United States in the 
last thirty years. For example, in 1975, commercial banks and 
thrifts held 56 percent of total credit to households and 
businesses; by 2005, this figure had dropped to 33 percent. 
A large fraction of financial assets—both equity and debt—
is sold directly by issuers/borrowers to investors, especially 
institutional investors, via stock and bond markets, with 
traditional banking effectively bypassed. 
The shift from a bank-based to a market-based financial 
system has expanded the types of activities that banks and other 
financial intermediaries engage in and the assets that they 
invest in. The large financial institutions at the core of the 
system have expanded their activities to intermediate the 
movement of capital among the various other participants in 
multiple ways. They assist businesses in the issuance of new 
stocks and bonds directly into the market (investment 
banking), intermediate to buy and sell stocks and bonds 
(market making) after issuance on behalf of clients (broker-
dealers/trading desks), manage asset portfolios on behalf of 
individuals and institutions (asset management), and lend 
directly to households and businesses (traditional commercial 
banking). A general trend toward consolidation of financial 
activity has led to the formation of large, complex institutions 
at the core of the financial system. At the same time, however, 
disintermediation has increased the importance of “end-user” 
financial institutions that invest in securities on behalf of 
households and firms. These include mostly unleveraged 
institutional investors (mutual funds, pension funds) as 
vehicles for household savings as well as more lightly regulated 
and more leveraged risk-bearing entities (hedge funds).2 
Market-based financial intermediation has a number of 
advantages over a banking-oriented financial system. One 
important advantage is that the investment risk in holding 
securities is dispersed broadly among investors instead of being 
concentrated in financial intermediaries. For example, debt 
instruments issued by ultimate borrowers are held directly by 
savers/investors to a greater degree than in a banking-oriented 
financial system. Another feature of today’s financial system 
that works to reduce systemic risk is the replacement of bank 
deposits by mutual fund shares as an investment vehicle for 
households. While the fixed face value of a bank deposit is 
inherently fragile, the value of a mutual fund share fluctuates 
with market prices daily. As a result, the mutual fund model is 
better able to absorb and disperse shocks across a wide set of 
investors.3
2Note too that any large market participant itself consists of a very large 
number of separate legal entities, with many different charters, incentive 
structures, constraints, and regulations. 
3Money market mutual funds raise some of the same issues as bank deposits 
because of their limited ability to bear credit losses; historically, parents of such 
funds have absorbed impaired money market instruments rather than allowed 
a credit loss to reduce the fund’s share value below $1.
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Although superior to a banking-oriented financial system in 
some respects, market-based financial intermediation carries 
its own vulnerabilities. The capital markets work best when key 
markets are liquid. In this context, the term liquidity refers to 
tradability. When a market is liquid, any single trade to buy or 
sell a particular asset is unlikely to have a major effect on the 
price of the asset because of the large number of willing 
transactors on both sides of the market. Market liquidity also 
ensures that investors can buy and sell securities without undue 
delay or loss in value from the price impact of the transaction. 
Almost by definition, then, a market-gridlock systemic crisis is 
a period when market liquidity is absent.
In normal circumstances, market liquidity rests on a 
number of foundations. Foremost among them are market 
making, trading, and arbitrage. Market makers buy and sell out 
of inventory they maintain to meet customer demand. They 
smooth out short-run imbalances in market supply and 
demand, and profit from the bid/ask spread. Traders also 
contribute to market liquidity by trading on bets that prices will 
converge to long-run fundamental levels. These traders 
typically take positions that they hold for potentially long 
periods of time until prices converge to their long-run norms. 
Traders play an important role in maintaining the stability of 
markets and speeding up the convergence of prices to their 
fundamental values.
Market-oriented crises tend to begin with a large change—
usually a decline—in the price of a particular asset; the change 
then becomes self-sustaining over time. When asset prices drop 
sharply, there are generally some participants willing to “swoop 
in” and buy assets that have declined sufficiently in price—an 
action that largely prevents the stress from becoming worse. 
In systemic crises, however, investors and traders are either 
unable or unwilling to step in, perhaps because their own losses 
have limited their trading capacity or because an infrastructure 
failure in, say, payments or settlement systems has made such 
a step difficult. As prices decline, more and more market 
participants sell, pushing prices lower. Eventually the price 
declines become so large and persistent that no buyers emerge, 
market liquidity dries up, market participants reduce their 
intermediation activities and their risk taking, and market 
gridlock takes hold. This sequence of events is in some measure 
self-reinforcing: if price declines are sufficiently large to create 
losses for traders and market makers, these participants may 
cease providing liquidity to the market, thereby exacerbating 
the price declines.
Market-based crises are often characterized by a 
coordination failure in which a wide cross-section of 
participants in financial markets, including market makers, 
simultaneously decide to reduce risk taking and effectively pull 
back from financing activities (trading stocks, issuing new 
stocks and bonds, lending, and so forth). While no one 
institution is necessarily insolvent or illiquid, each firm reduces 
its activity and risk to protect capital and profits. In aggregate, 
however, the firms’ actions combine to slow down or stop 
financial market activity. In severe cases, the financial system 
could become almost paralyzed and unable to perform its core 
functions of channeling capital to investment opportunities. 
The period immediately following the 1987 stock market crash 
is an example of this type of coordination failure, although its 
consequences were contained.
The potential for self-sustaining dynamics in financial price 
movements has been studied extensively in the finance and 
economics literature. Minsky (1977) and Kindleberger (1978) 
have advanced theoretical explanations for many varieties of 
financial crisis in which an exogenous change in the economic 
environment leads to the creation of new profit opportunities 
that attract capital fed by an expansion in credit.4 For a time, 
these investments give rise to even more profit opportunities, 
leading to a speculative euphoria that, by involving segments 
of the population typically not involved in such ventures, 
becomes a “mania” or a “bubble.” However, at a certain point, 
knowledgeable insiders begin to take profits and sell out. Prices 
begin to level off and some financial distress may ensue. A crisis 
occurs when a specific event precipitates the equivalent of a run 
on the asset class that was the subject of the speculative frenzy. 
Aversion develops toward that asset class by banks and others 
4The discussion in this paragraph draws heavily on Kindleberger (1978).
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that had previously lent against it, and with this aversion arises 
a desire to obtain liquidity at nearly any cost. The resulting 
panic culminates when 1) asset prices fall so low that investors 
are tempted back, 2) trading is cut off, perhaps by the closing of 
the relevant exchange, or 3) a lender of last resort succeeds in 
convincing the market that sufficient liquidity will be available 
if necessary.
Although not all economists would subscribe to this broad 
theory of speculative financial crises, the theory is useful to 
keep in mind, especially in relation to those features of the 
financial system that could make the system particularly 
vulnerable to large, self-sustaining changes in asset prices, 
and thus to market gridlock.
In modern financial systems, debt and leverage are 
necessary and pervasive. Many market participants, including 
the largest intermediaries, borrow funds in order to expand 
their balance sheets and thus increase their ability to invest and 
trade in financial assets. They adopt this strategy to increase 
their return on equity capital invested (that is, by holding assets 
expected to yield returns exceeding the cost of the funds 
borrowed). As noted earlier, the largest banks are nearly all 
leveraged more than ten to one, implying that such institutions 
cannot afford to realize losses greater than 10 percent of the 
value of their assets if they are to remain solvent. 
The obvious implication of leverage is the need for financial 
institutions to control their losses carefully and to take steps to 
reduce their risk taking in the face of declining asset values. In 
other words, leverage creates an incentive to sell assets whose 
prices are declining, particularly if further price declines are 
expected in the future. For example, if a firm is leveraged ten to 
one, then even a 1 percent realized loss in asset value translates 
to a 10 percent loss in the firm’s capital value. Collectively, of 
course, widespread selling after an asset price decline will likely 
push prices even lower and losses higher. This scenario raises 
the obvious concern that such liquidations would further 
amplify the underlying price movements.
Moreover, in some markets, liquidations after losses can be 
automatic. For example, when an investor trades stocks on 
margin accounts (by borrowing a percentage of the stock 
value), a subsequent decline in the value of the stock requires 
that the investor post (add) collateral—usually cash—in order 
to bring the margin account back into compliance with the 
margin rule of the stock exchange. 
In the 1987 stock market crash, large margin calls required 
investors to sell stock, thus putting further downward pressure 
on stock prices. The sudden and large fall in stock prices 
created large debits in the accounts of investors that had 
purchased stock on margin at brokers or held long positions in 
equity-linked derivatives contracts on futures exchanges. These 
margin account debits created a need to transfer large sums of 
cash that many investors were not able to provide within the 
time frames required by brokers and the futures exchanges.
An additional feature of contemporary financial markets 
that can create self-reinforcing asset price dynamics relates to 
financial products that exhibit convexity in their price 
behavior. Assets (or derivatives) with convexity are those that 
become more or less sensitive to changes in an underlying asset 
price (or other variable) as that price or variable changes. 
The classic example of convexity is an option. The buyer of 
a call (put) option has a right, but not an obligation, to buy (or 
sell) a particular asset (for example, 100 shares of IBM) at a 
particular price at some point in the future. Conversely, while 
the option buyer has a right to exercise, the writer or seller of 
the option has an obligation to perform. Those who have sold 
options to others are exposed to what market participants call 
negative convexity: as the underlying asset price moves against 
the seller of the option, the value of the option position 
becomes increasingly sensitive to further changes in the price of 
the underlying asset. In the case of a put option, if the seller of 
the option should try to compensate for this increased 
sensitivity by selling the underlying asset as a hedge against 
further price declines, it will put additional downward pressure 
on the underlying asset price. But a further decline in the 
underlying asset price simply increases the option sensitivity 
again, prompting even more selling. Thus, what appears to be 
a risk-mitigation strategy by the option seller locally is, in fact, 
a strategy that can reinforce adverse asset price dynamics when 
undertaken by a large number of sellers.
This phenomenon was evident in the 1987 stock market 
crash. At that time, many institutional investors had purchased 
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portfolio insurance from intermediaries or were attempting to 
replicate such insurance through dynamic hedging strategies. 
Portfolio insurance is nothing more than a put option on the 
underlying asset; it exhibits exactly the characteristics outlined 
above. The seller of the insurance (or the firm trying to 
replicate it) must hedge its position by selling in greater 
amounts as prices decline, creating even further downward 
price pressure. Although the extent to which such activity was 
responsible for stock price declines in October 1987 is heavily 
debated, there is little doubt that such strategies—if wide-
spread—could create self-reinforcing market movements.
Importance of Clearance and Settlement 
Arrangements 
Clearance and settlement mechanisms contributed greatly to 
the liquidity strains created by the large price declines across 
cash, futures, and options markets, and the resulting margin 
calls in the 1987 stock market crash. The different settlement 
arrangements and time frames for different products (that is, 
T+5 for stocks traded on the exchanges at that time in contrast 
to same-day settlement for stock index futures) meant that 
even investors that were hedged across the different markets 
could face large cash demands during the interim period.
This sudden need for large cash transfers threatened to 
create gridlock in the payments system and in the stock and 
futures markets. Securities firms did not have the funds to 
make margin payments at futures exchanges because their 
customers had not made margin payments to them. The 
futures exchanges’ credit risk management practices required 
that positions be closed out when margin payments were not 
made. This unwinding of futures positions would likely have 
triggered further massive selling pressures in the stock market, 
exacerbating what had already occurred. However, the 
concentration of risk in the clearinghouses used to guarantee 
settlement of both securities and futures transactions meant 
that if positions were not closed out and markets fell further, 
the integrity of the clearinghouses themselves could be 
threatened. Since these clearinghouses form a core part of 
the infrastructure supporting the relevant trading activities, 
such an outcome could have significantly impaired market 
functioning for a sustained period of time. 
In the end, large commercial banks were persuaded of the 
need to supply liquidity to those firms most heavily exposed 
to equities (that is, by lending against the value of those 
portfolios), and the most severe consequences were averted. 
However, the banks’ action was due in part to official sector 
appeals to their collective desire to avert a further deepening of 
the crisis, as well as a stated willingness by the Federal Reserve 
to make more liquidity generally available to the banking 
sector. 
This example illustrates the presence of systemic risk in 
wholesale market payments, clearance, and settlement, owing 
to the very sizable credit and liquidity exposures that typically 
characterize such arrangements, particularly on an intraday 
basis. In normal circumstances, the extension of such large 
amounts of intraday credit and liquidity between the major 
participants in these mechanisms facilitates more rapid 
settlement of the transactions. During a crisis, however, the 
reluctance of participants to continue doing business in this 
fashion can potentially lead to gridlock.
A case in point is the 1974 failure of Herstatt Bank, a midsize 
German bank that was closed down after it received the 
deutsche mark leg of its deutsche mark-U.S. dollar currency 
trades but before its pending U.S. dollar payments were 
completed in the United States. This created a short-term 
gridlock in the foreign exchange market that remained a source 
of systemic concern until the mid-1990s, when central banks 
made clear that the amounts of such “payment versus payment 
mismatch” were too large to be tolerated indefinitely and the 
large commercial banks invested in the CLS Bank, a system 
for simultaneously settling both sides of foreign exchange 
transactions.
Broadly speaking, central banks and others in the official 
sector have been pushing for continuing improvements in 
the robustness of payments, clearance, and settlement mecha-
nisms. These improvements provide greater assurance to 
investors that their transactions will settle, and that the 
mechanisms for payment and settlement will not themselves 
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become a channel for propagating systemic disturbances. 
Nevertheless, these arrangements remain highly complex and 
are increasingly concentrated. For example, most market 
participants effectively outsource payments, clearance, and 
custodial functions associated with their transactions to an 
increasingly small number of global banks that specialize in 
those activities.
In turn, these banks at the core of the financial system 
interact with a relatively small number of specialized 
organizations that actually provide the central settlement 
functions for specific assets. For example, the Federal Reserve 
provides settlement services for U.S. dollar wholesale payments 
through its Fedwire service while the European Central Bank 
does the same for euro-denominated payments. The Federal 
Reserve is involved in settlement services for U.S. government 
bonds through its book-entry and transfer services for those 
securities, while the Depository Trust and Clearing 
Corporation provides clearance and settlement services for a 
wide range of securities, including all equities traded on U.S. 
stock exchanges and corporate bonds. Significantly, all of these 
systems continue in one form or another to provide large 
amounts of intraday credit to their major participants.
Many financial markets (especially securities and futures 
markets) have, in addition to the settlement mechanism, a 
clearinghouse that provides further assurance that transactions 
will settle by interposing itself as the legal counterparty to both 
sides of the original transaction. The clearinghouse typically 
imposes margin requirements or other controls on member 
transactions while also maintaining its own financial resources 
and/or the ability to call on its members’ resources. Although 
clearinghouses have the ability to contain financial distress, 
the concentration of settlement risk in an exchange has the 
potential to focus it—as the 1987 stock market crash vividly 
illustrates—if problems are severe enough to call the integrity 
of the clearinghouse into question.
The Role of Central Banks
Central banks have historically played a key role in ensuring 
that financial markets have sufficient liquidity to function 
effectively. They have several tools that can be used in this 
regard. First, they control the aggregate supply of bank 
reserves—the ultimate unit of account. By increasing the 
supply of reserves, central banks can increase the aggregate 
amount of liquidity in the financial system. Second, central 
banks function as the lender of last resort, a role that gives them 
the ability to lend directly to individual commercial banks. In 
extraordinary circumstances, the Federal Reserve System also 
has the power to lend directly to any individual or corporation, 
although this power has not been exercised since the 1930s. 
Third, the central bank typically possesses sufficient influence 
to persuade market participants that a collective decision to 
make liquidity available in particular circumstances will 
produce a better outcome than if individual market partici-
pants all seek to “free ride” on the actions of others. Largely 
because these tools are so effective, the central bank can often 
forestall liquidity pressures simply by announcing its 
willingness to make liquidity available should the need arise. 
Such announcements were made by the Federal Reserve 
in the wake of the 1987 crash as well as after the events of 
September 11, 2001. Elaborate assurances of this kind were 
also given in advance of the Y2K rollover.
Of course, central bank actions to forestall financial crises 
may themselves have a cost. In line with the moral hazard 
argument discussed in the section on banking-oriented crises, 
it is important that market participants not become so 
complacent that they count on the central bank to defuse 
any potential market-oriented financial distress and thus 
underinvest in their own management of market and 
liquidity risks.
New Sources of Systemic Risk
In the last ten to twenty years, financial markets have evolved 
significantly. They are more global and involve a wider range 
of more complex products than ever before. In some areas, 
market activities have become increasingly concentrated in a 
handful of very large firms. In other areas, the role of smaller, 
more specialized entities has grown significantly. From a policy 
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perspective, there does not seem to be a clear consensus on 
whether the financial system today is more or less vulnerable 
to systemic disturbances than it was in, say, 1990.
Moreover, several of the most significant financial market 
disturbances of the last decade manifested features that, 
though present in earlier financial crises, have become more 
prominent. As the “supply chain” has evolved from the 
simplicity of a bank’s making and servicing a loan over its life 
to the complexity of securitization (involving originators, 
holders, servicers, trustees, and hedging markets), the focus 
on core banks and securities firms and major markets must 
expand to include other potential single points of failure. In 
addition, the economic forces leading to consolidation have 
included economies of scale in risk and liquidity management. 
The liquidity needed in key market-risk-management markets 
and in the processing of high-value dollar payments derives in 
substantial part from the natural offsetting of risks or payments 
when volumes are high. Finally, the global scale of large banks 
and securities firms and some major investors has expanded 
the channels that can transmit systemic risk. 
These new features raise interesting questions about 
whether the kinds of conceptual models outlined in the 
preceding two sections fully capture the range of possible 
causes and propagation channels for systemic risk. The 
discussion below addresses two cases: 1) the events of 1997 
and 1998 that involved currency crises in several Asian 
countries, the Russian debt default, and the collapse of the 
Long-Term Capital Management hedge fund, and 2) the 
disturbances in payment and settlement arrangements 
following operational disruptions resulting from the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001. 
Asia, Russia, and LTCM
This sequence of events began in the summer of 1997 as certain 
Asian countries faced a substantial change in market sentiment 
that exposed relatively fragile macroeconomic conditions. In 
particular, several countries had short-term foreign currency 
debts that far exceeded their international reserves. The 
countries were thus susceptible to a run on their currencies, 
with generally negative consequences from a macroeconomic 
point of view. While currency crises are an extremely well-
studied subset of economic crises, the Asian episode was 
notable in several respects. 
First, the Asian crisis was characterized by a significant 
interplay between macroeconomic and financial sector factors. 
This interplay reflected weakness in the banking sectors of 
some countries that, while not the root cause of the crisis in all 
cases, clearly affected how the crisis played out and how well 
each country absorbed the macroeconomic impact of the crisis. 
Second, consistent with the model of bank runs outlined 
earlier, contagion figured very prominently in the Asian crisis. 
Indeed, the events demonstrated a new mode of contagion. 
Various trading and risk management strategies now 
commonly used by market participants created linkages 
between different assets and activities that may not have 
previously existed, in some cases requiring positions in one 
currency to be adjusted largely as a result of movements in 
another. In some instances, a problem triggered by a currency 
or maturity mismatch in one country or market would lead 
global investors seeking to reduce risk to identify similar 
vulnerabilities in other markets. 
A year later, contagion figured in the relationships between 
Russian debt and the debt of Brazil and other emerging 
economies. Although the economies of Russia and Brazil are 
not themselves closely integrated, the prices of their debt 
fluctuated largely in tandem. In part, these parallel fluctuations 
reflected the fact that many of the holders of this debt 
specialized in holding the debt of emerging market countries, 
regarded these countries as proxies for each other, and needed 
to maintain some stability in their overall risk profile. Thus, 
when Russian debt began to be perceived as increasingly risky 
and to lose liquidity, some of these participants began to sell 
their Brazilian debt to reduce their risk profile and to take 
advantage of the Brazilian debt’s greater liquidity. Ultimately, 
of course, the correlation between these two assets broke down 
as Russia defaulted while Brazil did not.
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The Russian government default of August 1998 occurred 
against the backdrop of the Asian crisis that had been playing 
out over the preceding year, but otherwise took place in a 
period that was characterized both by the strong macro-
economic performance of the United States and by the strong 
financial condition of the major financial intermediaries. 
Nevertheless, the Russian default set in motion a chain of 
events that created significant fear among the leadership of 
those same intermediaries and served to reduce liquidity across 
most of the world’s capital markets for some months.
Long-Term Capital Management was a hedge fund that 
conducted leveraged trades involving both securities and 
derivatives on a large scale and used highly sophisticated 
mathematical approaches to manage its risk. The firm suffered 
a severe loss of capital when prices moved against its positions 
following the Russian default. While LTCM’s uniquely high 
leverage made it a fragile enterprise, it may not have been the 
only leveraged investor to be vulnerable, and this broader 
vulnerability may have played a role in amplifying the price 
shocks that occurred in a number of markets following the 
Russian default. For a year or two before the crisis, the liabilities 
of financial intermediaries had increased substantially relative 
to the liabilities of the nonfinancial sector, suggesting that 
others besides LTCM had also taken on more debt and were 
similarly vulnerable to price volatility and liquidity shocks. At 
the onset of the crisis, however, signs of an abrupt scaling back 
of leverage in trading activity emerged. For example, the 
repurchase contracts that securities dealers use to finance their 
own and customers’ trading positions showed a sharp and 
unusually sustained decline in volume. An implication of the 
deleveraging was that other traders that might have speculated 
against the fall in asset prices and thereby stabilized the markets 
were no longer a support in the markets.
As the ensuing market liquidity crisis unfolded during 
August and September 1998, growing risk aversion made ever 
larger numbers of investors seek out low-risk assets and retire 
to the sidelines, and credit spreads widened sharply beyond 
what had already occurred following the Russian default. 
To avoid a disorderly default, and the potentially adverse 
consequences of the further selling pressures it might have 
incited, a consortium of LTCM’s trading counterparties 
undertook a recapitalization of the hedge fund in what was 
essentially an informal bankruptcy procedure conducted by the 
creditors with the cooperation of the fund’s management.
Even after the LTCM recapitalization, however, spreads in 
many markets continued to widen as participants showed an 
ongoing aversion to risk. Other hedge funds in particular saw 
dramatic changes in the willingness of major intermediaries to 
finance their activities—a development that prompted further 
selling and spread widening. By mid-October, reports had 
grown that the situation was hindering the ability of 
nonfinancial businesses to raise capital and that risk aversion 
was beginning to manifest itself in payment and settlement 
procedures. Only after the Federal Reserve surprised markets 
with an intermeeting rate cut did the markets gradually return 
to normal.
While analysts differ in their views on whether the disorderly 
collapse of LTCM would have been a systemically significant 
event, the episode nevertheless signals the need to think 
broadly about the potential sources of systemic risk. In 
particular, how has the growing emphasis on trading 
activities—which are increasingly conducted through hedge 
funds—affected the potential for systemic risk? Does this 
emphasis create mechanisms for propagation that did not exist 
previously? Can these mechanisms be fully captured by the 
classical models associated with bank runs or market gridlock, 
or do they introduce fundamentally new elements?
Several recent trends in the financial markets bear on these 
questions. One trend relates to the blurring of distinctions 
between types of financial firms. Commercial banks that have 
traditionally focused on making loans have increasingly 
removed loans from their balance sheets through securitization 
(pooling loans such as mortgages into securities sold to 
investors) or outright trading of loans and securities; at the 
same time, they have increased their investment banking 
securities underwriting and trading activities. Conversely, 
some of the largest investment banks and trading houses now 
lend directly to businesses and households.
One result of this broadening of activities has been an 
increased volume of trading in asset types that have in the past 
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been regarded as illiquid. Traditionally, financial assets have 
been separated into liquid and illiquid assets: liquid assets 
(such as stocks and government bonds) are priced and traded 
regularly after issue on exchanges or in large interdealer 
markets, while illiquid assets (such as bank loans) are held by 
financial institutions, particularly commercial banks, over 
long periods of time and are rarely traded or priced after 
origination. In recent years, however, the sharp distinction 
between liquid and illiquid assets has eroded, and liquidity, or 
tradability, has become a continuum. While some types of 
assets still trade very little after issuance, there is a trend toward 
trading asset types that have traditionally been regarded as 
illiquid—for example, bank loans, debt and equity of small 
firms, and debt of bankrupt or distressed firms.
Moreover, financial institutions now securitize many 
previously illiquid assets. Securitization involves pooling 
together collections of illiquid assets such as mortgages, auto 
loans, or credit card loans and creating a relatively standardized 
security that pays investors the cash flows from these assets. As 
a result of these changes, market participants today trade and 
price a much wider array of risky assets—at least when markets 
are functioning normally. During times of financial market 
distress, however, the liquidity of many assets can drop sharply, 
and differences in liquidity across asset types can widen 
dramatically.
Similarly, the tremendous growth in the use of financial 
derivatives reflects the increased tradability of financial risk. 
A substantial amount of current financial market activity 
involves the repackaging of claims on underlying assets and the 
redistribution of the underlying risks. This last activity has 
spawned enormous growth in the trading of derivatives, which 
are contingent claims in which payoffs are conditioned on the 
behavior of underlying variables such as interest rates or equity 
prices. The institutions at the core of the financial markets not 
only participate in these various activities, but also frequently 
serve as market-making intermediaries.
Derivatives offer a number of advantages in the trading and 
hedging of the price risks in underlying assets. First, because 
they are equivalent to a leveraged trading position, derivatives 
contracts can often be entered into with very little capital up 
front. Thus, they are an ideal hedging instrument because the 
underlying risk can be hedged without the cost of committing 
a substantial amount of capital. At the same time, however, 
the leveraged nature of derivatives contracts makes them risky 
trading instruments, and traders that use these instruments to 
speculate can lose large sums very quickly. Second, the ability 
to structure and specify the particular underlying risk that a 
derivatives contract is exposed to enables users to unbundle 
a collection of risks embodied in an asset and trade the 
components separately. This precision also makes derivatives 
an ideal hedging and trading tool, since a hedger can choose 
which risk to hedge and which to leave uncovered. 
An important consequence of the widespread use of 
derivatives contracts is the parsing and dispersal of the risks 
embodied in underlying assets. Overall, this has provided a 
net benefit to the economy, because risks that would have 
remained locked up and concentrated in underlying assets are 
now spread out and allocated to those more willing to bear 
them. This ability to transfer unbundled risks through 
derivatives contracts separately from the aggregates in 
underlying assets enables investors to better select which risks 
they are exposed to, providing two important benefits: lower 
risk premia in asset prices because investors are no longer 
locked into bearing unwanted risks, and the potential for a 
better allocation of risks to those more able to bear them.
Accompanying the growth of trading in less liquid assets 
and derivatives has been the general trend toward fair value 
accounting for more types of instruments and positions. Fair 
value, or mark-to-market, accounting imposes a discipline and 
transparency that can force institutions to take action to 
address emerging problems that might not occur under 
historical cost accounting. By contrast, historical cost 
accounting is more likely to allow serious problems to go 
undetected and unaddressed for longer periods of time.
A second significant trend, alluded to earlier, is the 
increasing role played by a broader range of market 
participants—not only hedge funds but also other forms 
of specialized vehicles such as private equity firms and 
collateralized debt obligation managers. These new agents for 
risk bearing have the potential to alter the dynamics of how the 
financial system as a whole manages risk. By allowing risk to be 
spread more widely, they have the potential to help insulate the 
financial system against external shocks. In the view of some 
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analysts, however, a greater capacity for risk bearing may lead 
the system to become even more inclined to cyclical behavior. 
The extent to which these new entrants are stabilizing or 
destabilizing depends in part on whether the extent of 
aggregate leverage in the financial system is greater today than 
in the past, since more highly leveraged institutions are more 
susceptible to large shocks that erode capital. Another critical 
question relates to the linkages between these new entrants and 
the traditional financial intermediaries. For example, in a 
financial crisis, it may not be sufficient for banks to have 
transferred risks to hedge funds if the ultimate source of 
financing and liquidity for those hedge funds remains the 
banks themselves. Again, the overall impact will likely depend 
on whether the new arrangements increase or decrease the 
amount of total equity capital at stake (including both bank 
equity and hedge fund investors’ equity) relative to the size 
of the risks being taken.
A third trend is the strong emphasis that leveraged 
institutions—not only the large banking and securities 
intermediaries but also the majority of hedge funds—put on 
quantitative models for the pricing and risk management 
of their activities. Risk management practices at such 
organizations owe a significant debt to the efforts over the 
past fifty years of many academics and practitioners to apply 
statistical and mathematical techniques to the problem of 
analyzing movements and comovements in market prices and 
other relevant variables. Such analysis, leavened in most cases 
by market experience, is used to help assess a firm’s ability to 
operate safely with different combinations of assets and 
leverage. Risk management strategies are also obviously critical 
in influencing how financial market participants will react to 
changes in market conditions. To the extent that there is 
commonality in risk management models and strategies, there 
is potential for a broad cross-section of market participants to 
react similarly to changes in asset prices.
In valuing complex derivatives transactions, it is often 
necessary to interpolate or extrapolate the fair value of such 
instruments using mathematical models calibrated to the 
observed market values of other, simpler instruments. In some 
cases, these models are very difficult to test against an objective 
reality beyond the fact that other participants are using similar 
models. It is no accident that models are most commonly used 
to price relatively illiquid assets; thus, during periods of 
financial distress, actual prices are most likely to differ 
substantially from modeled prices. A related issue is the degree 
to which the positions and strategies of the diverse participants 
in various markets are correlated. To the extent that many 
participants are pursuing very similar strategies and will behave 
very similarly in response to market shocks, the diversification 
of the system as a whole may be less than it appears during 
more benign periods.
All of these trends—a substantial emphasis on trading, risk 
transfer, and derivatives; greater market involvement by hedge 
funds; and a heavy reliance on quantitative risk management 
models—were at work to some extent in the LTCM episode. 
While the classical models of bank runs and market gridlock 
were undoubtedly also relevant to LTCM, the episode 
highlights the need to expand these models to incorporate 
more fully the potential endogeneities and feedback effects 
generated by the trends discussed here.
September 11, 2001, and the Reliance 
on Critical Infrastructure
While the growth of hedge funds underscores how financial 
market activities have expanded beyond the major commercial 
and investment banks, the financial sector events following 
9/11 emphasize the reliance of the financial sector on certain 
core elements of infrastructure and on a relatively small 
number of organizations. Two related aspects of the post–9/11 
period merit discussion in this regard.
First, the terrorist attacks of that day did widespread damage 
to both property and communications systems in Lower 
Manhattan.5 Because many of the largest commercial banks 
had operating facilities in this area (or had electronic 
communications routed through hubs in the area), they were 
unable to make payments as they normally would. Since most 
5This discussion draws heavily on McAndrews and Potter (2002).
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large banks normally both send and receive a large volume of 
Fedwire payments every day, relying heavily on incoming 
payments for the liquidity to make their own payments, the 
normal coordination of payments broke down and liquidity 
shortages developed at many banks.
From a systemic perspective, the Federal Reserve attaches 
extreme importance to keeping the Fedwire system open; 
otherwise, this central aspect of the financial system 
nationwide would not be able to function at all. Indeed, in 
the wake of 9/11, the Federal Reserve extended the operating 
hours of the system to help provide more time for banks to 
execute their transactions. In addition, the Federal Reserve 
made more liquidity available, both to individual banks 
through its discount window operations and to the system 
generally through open market operations. These measures, 
along with the willingness of the Federal Reserve to permit 
sizable intraday overdrafts, helped restore normal functioning 
to the payments system.
A second set of issues arose in the market for U.S. 
government securities. The clearance and settlement of these 
securities (as well as a number of other fixed-income securities) 
are concentrated in two commercial banks. These same two 
banks provide the primary mechanism through which the 
securities portfolios of the major securities firms are financed 
on a daily basis (the “tri-party repo market”). The financing 
itself is provided by money market mutual funds and pension 
funds primarily, but the two banks provide the systems, 
services, and intraday credit on which this nearly $1.5 trillion 
market critically depends.
Following the 9/11 attacks in New York City, one of these 
two clearing banks suffered very significant operational 
disruptions, reflecting the proximity of its primary as well as 
back-up operating sites to downtown Manhattan. Although 
these disruptions did not completely obstruct the processing of 
securities transactions, the processing slowed considerably. 
Further, the destruction of brokers’ offices obstructed the 
clearing and reconciliation of trades, and trade records were 
not fully reconciled for several weeks. In the meantime, the 
uncertainty arising from the disruptions contributed to a 
significant increase in the number of trades that failed to settle. 
This “fails” problem became so serious that the U.S. Treasury 
conducted an unprecedented reopening of the auction for the 
ten-year note in order to increase the supply of that security in 
the marketplace.6
6See Fleming and Garbade (2002).
Although the systemic financial consequences of the events 
of 9/11 are probably best described as a “near miss,” they do 
demonstrate the global financial system’s vulnerability. 
Investigation of the possible outcomes of the attacks indicates 
that if one of the two clearing banks had not, in fact, been 
capable of operating for a sustained period of time, the task 
of replicating such functionality elsewhere would have taken 
considerable time, possibly as much as a year or more. In 
the meantime, the underlying securities markets that are 
supported by the financing activities that clear through these 
banks would be disrupted. In particular, the U.S. government 
securities market that forms the basis for the implementation 
of U.S. monetary policy and the financing of U.S. government 
activities and that is used as “riskless” collateral in countless 
financial transactions worldwide could be impaired. 
While this particular vulnerability was highlighted by the 
events following the 9/11 attacks, it is almost certainly not the 
only critical “choke point” in the global financial system today. 
That is, the operational disruption of other relatively modest 
organizations or physical facilities could significantly damage 
the functioning of the overall financial system. Indeed, the last 
decade has seen increased concentration in the provision of 
critical infrastructure services such as payments, settlement, 
and custody activities. Not surprisingly, the potential systemic 
risk associated with threats to such critical infrastructure has 
since 9/11 spurred a significant amount of effort by both the 
public and the private sectors to increase the resiliency of that 
infrastructure.
Clearly, traditional financial models of systemic risk cannot 
readily capture the type of systemic risk that arises from the 
potential for critical points of failure to lead to broader 
disruptions in the system. For one, the proximate cause is more 
operational than financial in nature. Nevertheless, the financial 
aspects cannot be ignored. As the example of the breakdown in 
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payments flows illustrates, even if the initial disruption stems 
from physical damage or computer malfunction, the methods 
of propagation may still be financial. Thus, there is a strong 
need for models that are more capable of capturing the 
complex interactions between operational infrastructure and 
the financial flows that the infrastructure supports. Similar 
models would be helpful in understanding the consequences 
of a pandemic event that made it impossible for large numbers 
of urban employees to work from their offices. Is the existing 
financial system capable of a smooth transition to a tempo-
rarily reduced level of activity? Current models cannot readily 
even frame such a question. 
Implications for Systemic Risk
Three interesting themes emerge from the events discussed in 
this section. First, the number of relevant points of failure has 
increased with the growing complexity of the financial system. 
Large financial institutions such as banks and major financial 
markets such as the U.S. equity market continue to be focal 
points in any assessment of systemic risk. But new sources of 
risk have arisen with the growth of risk transfer through 
securitization and derivatives as well as the increasing use of 
central counterparties and other specialist financial institutions 
that fill specific roles in the financial market infrastructure. 
One further implication is that when individual institutions 
have problems, the number of business relationships and 
elements of risk has expanded dramatically. 
Second, as the volume of transactions—payments, 
derivatives, and secondary-market trading—has increased, the 
apparently strong economies of scale in risk and liquidity 
pooling have led to consolidation, typically into a subset of the 
larger financial institutions. The high velocity of transactions 
creates substantial efficiencies that are reflected in timing and 
pricing. However, sharp slowdowns in transaction volume, 
such as those occurring in the payments system after 9/11, can 
reverse these efficiencies and potentially impair the perfor-
mance of the financial system when key parts of the system are 
under stress. Similarly, a key institution’s loss of credit standing 
can diminish the flow of business substantially and increase the 
cost of managing its derivatives or payments books.
Third, in the information-rich global environment that has 
emerged over the last few decades, the potential for contagion 
has changed. That potential continues to include direct 
linkages among large institutions through common credit and 
market exposures or exposures to one another, although many 
policy changes and enhancements to private risk management 
have sought to reduce that potential. Now, however, the 
potential for contagion has expanded to include associations 
between risk dimensions created through common investors, 
similarities in risk profiles and risk appetites, and common 
exposures to macro-level risk factors such as geopolitical risk. 
In periods of distress, such as the Asian currency crises, the 
Russian debt default, or the LTCM collapse, such associations 
may lead to the propagation of market disturbances in hard-to-
predict and probabilistic ways, and therefore make crises more 
difficult to anticipate and manage. 
Questions for Discussion
This background paper covers many different subjects at a 
relatively high level. Some key questions that conference 
participants might pursue are: 
￿ What types of models of systemic failure or collapse have 
proved useful in other disciplines? How applicable are 
these models to the kinds of issues discussed above?
￿ Which aspects of the financial system seem most 
important and/or challenging to capture in considering 
the potential for systemic risk in the financial sector?
￿ What potential avenues for future cross-disciplinary 
collaboration on systemic risk issues seem most 
promising?
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